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WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
REVISED EDITION BY SAMUEL WILLISTON AND
GEORGE J. THOMPSON-A REVIEW
HORACE E. WHITESIDE

The first edition of Williston on Contracts, published in 1920, was a comprehensive treatment of the law of contracts from the pen of a great teacher
and scholar and has remained in the small class of great books of the law.
Practitioners have relied upon its remarkably accurate statement of the law;
judges have enriched their opinions from its masterly exposition; and teachers
and students have found within its pages the story of the law's development
together with a critical discussion of its foundations and an analysis of its
reasoning.
Four volumes of the Revised Edition were published in 1936 and a fifth
in 1937. The sixth will appear within a few months, completing the text.'
After pointing out the scope of this work, with reference both to the subject
matter covered and the detail and method of treatment, this review will
discuss briefly the inter-relation of the Revised Edition and the Restatement
of Contracts. A number of topics will then be examined for the purpose of
indicating the extent to which the general views and conclusions of the first
edition have been modified.
SCOPE OF THE WORK

This work, even more than the original edition, might be called the law of
obligations. It contains the basic principles of the law of contract and a
complete treatment of its specialized branches, such as bills and notes,
contracts of suretyship, contracts for the sale of goods, contracts for the sale
of land, contracts of bailees and innkeepers, and contracts of common carriers.
In addition, much of the law governing relational rights and duies is included.2 Thus, the imposed duties of common carriers and other public
service companies are considered in detail, as well as the rights and duties of
husband and wife, parent and child, and landlord and tenant. So also, the
fiduciary rights and duties of trustees and agents are frequently discussed.

'A seventh volume containing forms only is in preparation and will be ready as soon
as the text is completed. The eighth volume will contain the index and table of cases,
a table of law review articles, and a table of sections of the Restatement of Contracts.
The table of cases will contain approximately 80,000 cases, twice the number in the first
edition, indicating the tremendous amount of work and care that has gone into fhe
preparation of this book.
The original edition contained very few references to legal periodicals, but in the
Revised Edition the authors have added .numerous references to articles in legal periodicals and notes on recent cases. The best of these discussions are also available in the
Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts and references to that publication have
been included.
'See § 32A.
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True, these topics are covered in part for the purpose of comparison with
the duties undertaken by contract, but the treatment is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed to give to the practitioner a reasonably well-rounded
discussion of their subject matter.
The detail with which special topics are treated is shown by an examination
of Chapter XXXVI dealing with the transportation contracts of common
carriers. This chapter contains extended discussions of charter parties, bills
of lading and legislation with reference thereto, the duties and liabilities of a
common carrier for goods and passengers, the duty to load and unload goods
in carriage by ship and by railroad and the related problems of demurrage
for detention of vessels and railroad cars, credit instruments, and bank regulations of export commercial credit instruments. Section 11 13A discusses the
modern problem of contracts of carriage in international transportation by
air, including a full discussion of the Warsaw Convention of 1929; Section
1114A, federal legislation regulating messages by wire and radio; and Section
1134B, the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936.
The pervasiveness of the authors' treatment and the varying types of new
material are shown by sampling a few sections, especially those new to the
Revised Edition. For example, Section 59A covers general offers and the
revocation thereof by radio; and Sections 90 to 90E, implication of assent and
counter-promises arising from conduct, including the signing or acceptance of
a document, telegraph blank, bill of lading, ticket, etc., or the acceptance of
goods or services. Section 401A discusses the mortgagee's rights under a
fire insurance policy procured by the mortgagor; Section 421A, the assignment
of requirement or output contracts; Section 438A, informal gifts of intangible
rights; and Section 438B, gifts by deed or formal writing of rights not
represented by documents.
The discussion of incontestable clauses in policies of life insurance has been
expanded,, and suicide clauses and provisions excluding or limiting risks, distiriguished (§ 811). The section following contains a general discussion of
the effect of merger clauses in written contracts, the relation of such clauses
to the parol evidence rule, and whether evidence of prior fraudulent representations of either principal or agent is excluded by reason of such clauses.
Much of the material in Chapter XXX on conditions implied in fact and
independent duties is new and represents a development that has taken place
since the publication of the original edition. This chapter includes a classification of independent duties and considers whether breach of a separate contract
furnishes an excuse for non-performance, whether mutual debts cancel one
another, and the problem of retention of debts, non-performance of an
aleatory promise as an excuse, and the rescission of aleatory contracts.
Chapter XXXII contains an excellent discussion of transfer of risk in land
contracts, including the statute recommended by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and comments on the Roman Law and Civil Law.
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The following sections in Volume V are of special interest: the detailed
treatment of measure of damages for non-acceptance of goods (§§ 1378
et seq.); damages for breach of contracts to devise or bequeath property
(§ 1411A); specific performance in employment contracts (§ 1423A);
specific performance in co6perative marketing contracts ( § 1423B) ; and
specific enforcement of negative covenants in employment and other contracts (§§ 1450A, 1450B). Chapter XLVIII on contracts in restraint of
trade contains an excellent analysis of illegality in contracts. The sections
on restraint of trade and labor problems have been thoroughly revised in
accordance with recent developments. State and federal legislation dealing
with resale price maintenance, price fixing, price discrimination, bargains of
co6perative associations of agricultural producers, and the remedies for unlawful restraint of trade have been carefully considered.
STATUTES

Throughout the work valuable references to statutes, and in many instances
detailed discussions of statutory material affecting the law of contracts, have
been included. The discussions and annotations of the many uniform statutes
governing commercial transactions are surprisingly complete and accurate.
These include not only the Negotiable Instrument Law, the Sales Act, and the
Bills of Lading Acts, but also the Conditional Sales Act, the Warehouse
Receipts Act, the Written Obligations Act, The Bank Collection Code and the
Uniform Bank Collection Act, and the Joint Obligations Act.
References to and discussions of federal regulatory legislation are particularly full and important. The treatment of the Interstate Commerce Act in
Chapter XXXVI is worthy of special mention. Other statutes, the discussion
of which enriches Volume V, are the Securities, Securities Exchange, and
Public Utility Holding Company Acts (§ 1516B); and in the chapter on
contracts in restraint of trade, the Anti-Trust Acts, Federal Trade Commission Act, National Labor Relations Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, and
many others.
Section 1777, in the sixth volume as yet unpublished, covers state regulation
of the production and distribution of natural resources within the borders of
the state and points out the possibility of such regulation by interstate compacts
under the Federal Constitution. Section 1777A contains a full discussion of
the important decisions and statutes dealing with the police power of the
states over public utility contracts with municipalities. It covers also the
closely analogous problem of state regulation of public utility affiliates even
when such affiliates are engaged in interstate commerce, 'state regulation of
bargains for intrastate or interstate use of the state's highways, and state
regulation of bargains for the issuance and sale of securities by public utility
corporations. Finally, this section points out the recent extension of state
police power into the fields of price fixing, resale price maintenance, and
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regulation of contracts of private industries (other than public utilities),
when such industries are "affected with a wide-spread public interest arising
from general economic conditions operating upon a paramount industry
intimately related to the public welfare."
On the other hand, Section 1778 covers in detail the extension of federal
regulation into the fields of intrastate bargains affecting interstate commerce,
issuance of securities by interstate carriers, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Communications Act of
1934, Federal Power Act of 1935, Tennessee Valley Authority Act, Federal
Rural Electrification Act of 1936, Federal Air Commerce Act of 1926, the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933,
the National Housing Act of 1934, and the now defunct Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 and National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.
RELATION TO RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

As is stated in the preface, the American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law of Contracts is in large measure based upon the original edition; Professor
Williston was the Reporter of the Restatement and Professor Thompson was
one of his Advisers. Hence, it was to be expected that the experience of the
Reporter in drafting the Restatement, aided and modified both by the critical
discussions with his Advisers and suggestions from the members of the
Institute, would enrich and color the Revised Edition of the book. In this
connection the preface says:
"[The authors] have made it a primary purpose in their undertaking to
provide such an exposition of the decisions and reasons supporting the
rules of the Restatement as might fairly take the place of the treatise
which was originally planned as a part of the Institute's publication. To
this end the presentation of the law in the revised treatise has been carefully collated with the Restatement, the various sections of which are
referred to, wherever appropriate, throughout the text and notes. The
distinctive contributions of the Restatement are pointed out and evaluated
and the position of the Restatement on all controversial subjects defined
and supported."
This somewhat surprising statement cannot mean that a Revised Edition of
Williston on Contracts was needed to support the Restatement of Contracts,
but rather that the purpose of the authors is to provide in the Revised Edition
an exposition of the modern law of contract including and emphasizing the
significant developments embodied in the Restatement.
The discussion of topics which were developed or expanded in the Restatement is most helpful. Section 1570A illustrates the point. The Restatement
of Contracts, Section 503, declares that differing mistakes of each of the
parties to a contract do not make the contract voidable where the respective
mistakes relate to different matters, since such mistakes are equivalent merely
'Citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940, 89 A. L.
R. 1469 (1933), affirming 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694 (1933). See also § 1658 B.
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to unilateral mistakes on each side, but "if the mistakes relate to the same
matter, the power of avoidance is not precluded because the mistakes of the
parties as to that fact are not the same." The rule announced in the Restatement is predicated upon the basic assumption test, i.e., that avoidance for
mistake should be permitted where the parties were mistaken (though in
different ways)*as to the basic assumptions upon which they contracted. By
way of illustration :4
A contracts to sell B a specific stone. A believes it to be a topaz and B
believes it to be a tourmaline. It is in fact a yellow diamond of vastly
greater value than either a topaz or tourmaline. A can avoid the contract.
The mistake as to the character of the stone is mutual.
5
This hypothetical case is based on the Wood v. Boynton, where the plaintiff
sold to a jeweler for one dollar a straw-colored stone which she had found. The
plaintiff had been told the stone was a topaz, and the jeweler thought it might be
so, but both realized they were ignorant of its exact nature and value. It proved
to be a rough diamond worth seven hundred dollars. The Wisconsin court did
not allow avoidance since it found no mistake as to the identity of the object
sold but merely as to its value. Under the Restatement, however, avoidance
is possible if each party is mistaken as to the type of stone, even though the
mistakes differ, and probably also where both are grossly mistaken as to its
value. Section 1570A, when read with the accompanying sections, presents
fully the reasoning upon which the Restatement is based, together with the
authorities pro and con, as well as the orthodox common law decisions.
Another illustration of changes resulting from the work on the Restatement
of Contracts may be observed in the discussion of indirect communication of
revocation of an offer. The criticism of this doctrine both on grounds of
theory and practical convenience is continued in the Revised Edition, but the
doctrine as announced in the Restatement with respect to contracts for the sale
6
of land and specified personal property is accepted. The influence of the
Restatement is particularly noticeable in the discussion of the interpretation of
offers of unilateral contracts (§ 31A), the revocation of such offers, and the
effect of tender (§§ 60-60B) ; the doctrine announced in Section 45 of the
Restatement is followed, and the corresponding rules of the Civil Law are
stated for purposes of comparison. As was to be expected, the Restatement
7
is emphasized in the treatment of promissory estoppel and other exceptions to

§ 503, Illustration 3.
'64 Wis. 265, 25 N. W. 42 (1885).
§§ 57, 57A; RESTATEMENT § 42.
7§§ 139, 140. Notwithstanding the emphasis on promissory estoppel and the espousal
"RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

of that cause as announced in the Restatement, the Revised Edition does not approve a
somewhat similar doctrine which has been generally accepted by the courts, under
one theory or another, that performance of or a promise to perform a prior contractual
duty to the promisee will support a promise of additional consideration (§§ 130, 130A;
RESTATEMENT § 76). The notion that parties should perform their contractual duties
even at a loss without asking for additional pay has impressed the authors more than it
has impressed the courts. But the stigma of contract-breaker does not attach to'a party
who bargains for an additional reward for performing or promising to perform his
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the consideration requirement (Chapter VII). So also, the analysis of the
Restatement is followed in the sections on acceptance of offers by silence,
including the effect of the offeree's intent in remaining silent or his previous
direction to the offeror to treat silence as acceptance. 8 The effect of the
Restatement is again apparent in Section 1293A, which presents an excellent
treatment of implied promises not to prevent or hinder performance by the
other party and not to prevent the happening of a condition on which the other
party's duty is dependent, together with the situations in which no such promise
would be implied.
GENERAL VIEWPOINT

A considerable shift in viewpoint is to be found in the treatment of a
number of important topics. For example, Chapter XIV on contracts for the
benefits of third persons has been expanded and in some sections entirely
reorganized. Much of the argument of the first edition has been retained, as,
for example, the argument that a court of equity is the proper forum for
enforcing the right of a beneficiary, 9 though most American jurisdictions allow
a suit at law by either donee or creditor beneficiary. But in general, a more
sympathic attitude toward the third party beneficiary doctrine is found
throughout this chapter. The emphasis on the "sole beneficiary" found in the
first edition has largely disappeared, and the more l;elpful classification"0 of
donee beneficiaries, creditor beneficiaries, and incidental beneficiaries has been
adopted from the Restatement. A new Section 356A contains a valuable
discussion of the tests by which the courts determine what beneficiaries are
within the protected types. And Section 364A considers the limitations on the
beneficiary's right imposed by the'terms and conditions of the contract. At
times the changed viewpoint is apparent even in the section headings; for
example, in Section 361 of the first edition the heading reads "Contract to
discharge a debt of the promisee", while in the Revised Edition the heading
is "Creditor beneficiary may enforce a promise to discharge the promisee's
debt to him." The scope of the revision in this chapter is further illustrated by
the expanded discussion of statutes (§ 365), the detailed statement of the law
in the several states including a valuable summary of the recent New York
trend (§ 368), the discussion of rights under statutory bonds and bonds given
to secure the payment of laborers and materialmen under building contracts
(§ 372), and a new section on the beneficiary problem in collective bargaining
agreements and co6perative marketing agreements (§ 379A).
It; the treatment of the doctrine of anticipatory breach, however, the
prior contractual duty to a third person. Such performance or promise is accepted as
sufficient consideration by the authors though it is not generally so accepted by the
courts (§§ 131, 131A). .
8§§ 91-91D: RESTATEMENT § 72.
'§§ 358, 359.
1O§356.
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analysis and conclusions of the original edition have been changed but little.
In fact, the doctrine is attacked even more vigorously in the Revised Edition.
The authors recognize fully that a contracting party is liable for breach of
promises fairly to be implied in the contract, i.e., "any promises which a reasonable man in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding
were included,""1 as in many instances an implied promise of cobperation,
and including also in most cases an implied promise not to prevent or hinder
performance by the other party and not to prevent the happening of any other
condition on which the promisor's duty is dependent.12 But, except in the
case of a promise to marry,' 3 they reject as unsound in logic the notions that
there can be a breach of a promise to perform an act before the time for
performance has arrived and that a suit by the injured party can be instituted
4
before that time on the basis of such anticipatory repudiation.
One argument is that the doctrine of anticipatory breach could not have
arisen before the decline of technical rules of common law pleading, since the
injured party could not have framed a declaration in special assumpsit.' 5 The
value of this argument to the authors appears when we appreciate that it does
not prevent the party injured by an anticipatory repudiation from relying upon
it as an excuse for not performing his own contractual promise, or defending
an action brought against him, or rescinding the contract.' 6 In short, the
doctrine of anticipatory breach could not have arisen had sound principles of
pleading been observed and had the distinction between defense and right of
action been recognized.' 7 Even the supposed practical convenience of the
doctrine' 8 and its general acceptance by the courts 0 do not impress the authors.
In the Restatement of Contracts, ° the doctrine of breach by anticipatory
repudiation was accepted "Except in the cases of a contract originally unilateral
and not conditional on some future performance by the promisee, and of a
contract originally bilateral that has become unilateral and similarly unconditional by full performance by one party." Thus, apparently, unilateral
promises in insurance contracts were treated as subject to the doctrine where
such promises were conditional on some future act or performance by the
promisee. But in the Revised Edition practically all unilateral obligations,
especially where for the payment of money, are excluded from the doctrine.
In Section 1330A it is strongly urged that fhe doctrine should not apply to
insurance contracts for the payment of money in future installments (for
1293.
'§ 1293A.
"§ 1320.
,§1296.
'§ 1306.
lo§1316.
1?§1315.
xs§1321.
19§ 1314.
"-§318.
f§
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example, disability payments), though conditional upon some act or performance by the insured. In this instance, the authors have not supported the
doctrine as announced in the Restatement. The reason may be found in two
recent decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States, 21 repudiating the
earlier contrary authority in the lower federal courts. Whether these decisions
by the Supreme Court will be generally accepted by state courts remains an
open question.
It is worth noting that doctrines somewhat analogous to anticipatory breach
22
have recently been developed in the Civil Law, especially in Germany.
In the discussions of restitution, also, the authors have modified but little the
general analysis and views of the original edition. Chapter XLIV is entitled
"Rescission and Restitution for Breach of Contract; Quasi-Contractual Recovery," and in Section 1455 of this chapter it is stated that "the right of
rescission and restitution generally exists as an alternative remedy to an action
for damages where there has been repudiation or a material breach of a contract, and is most commonly exercised when the aggrieved party has performed
fully or in part, and wishes to recover what he has given or its value." The
authors insist that after a total breach or repudiation of a contract the injured
party may, when he has performed fully or in part under the contract, rescind
the contract and secure restitution as an alternative to an action for damages.
Moreover, the recovery is repeatedly spoken of as quasi-contractual. About
one third of the chapter is devoted to recovery by a party in default under a
contract and the measure of such recovery; and several sections relate to
rescission for breach of warranty in a sale of goods.
The Restatement of Contracts treats restitution as an alternative remedy for
a total breach of contract 23 and does not dwell upon the supposed rescission
by the injured party following the breach. Moreover, the Restatement does
not label the recovery "quasi-contract." The Restatement does, however,
treat under the same topic recovery by a person who is himself in default and
recovery for performance under a contract discharged by impossibility.
Both in the Restatement 24 and in the Revised Edition (Section 1454) it is
stated that the recovery in restitution is for the value of the performance
rendered by the injured party and received by the other party: In the
Restatement, however, the supposed requirement that the performance be
received by the other party is so completely diluted in the Comment and
Illustrations that it practically disappears; and in the Revised Edition very
little point is made of this requirement although there are certain rather
Mobley v. New York Life Ins. Co., 295 U. S. 632, 55 Sup. Ct. 876, 79 L. ed. 1621,
M
99 A. L. R. 1166 (1935) ; Viglas v. New York Life Ins. Co., 78 F. (2d) 829 (1935)
reversed 297 U. S. 672, 56 Sup. Ct. 615, 80 L. ed. 604 (1936).
m§ 1337A.

-§§ 326, 347.

2-§348.
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confusing statements in Sections 1480 to 1483 dealing with recovery by a
plaintiff in default.
As is stated in Section 1455, it may be admitted "This choice of remedies
[the choice between damages and restitution] was not allowed by the early
English law, and there are still many exceptions and ihconsistencies 25 in the
application of the rule, which are due in part to the fact that it has been developed very largely under cover of the fictitious declaration in indebitatis
assumpsit, and of equally fictitious inferences that a refusal to perform a contract indicates assent to rescind it and restore what has been given under it."
The emphasis on rescission, receipt of benefits, and quasi-contract certainly
does not help in clearing up the inconsistencies and confusion which exist with
reference to restitution as a remedy for breach of contract. Among the
questions that will continue to puzzle the courts so long as this emphasis is
continued are the following: restitution after part performance by the defendant (§ 1460), whether plaintiff must return all consideration received by him
before suing for restitution at law (§ 1460A), rescission following repudiation
or a total breach where no performance has been rendered by the injured party
(§§ 1465-1467), and whether notice of rescission or manifestation of an
election to rescind is required of the injured party (§ 1469).
It is a strange notion that the only action on a contract or for the enforcement of a contract is an action which could have been brought in special
assumpsit under the technical rules of common law pleading, while an action
in general assumpsit to recover the value of the performance rendered by a
party under the contract is not an action on the contract but is quasi-contract.
Certainly, the notion is strange to one who does not mourn the passing of
special pleading. In substance, a plaintiff who sues for the value of his
performance under a contract after a total breach by the other party invokes
and relies on the contract as definitely and completely as a plaintiff who in this
situation sues for damages.
To say that the remedy of damages and the remedy of restitution are
alternative remedies for breach of contract makes sense. To say that a suit
for damages is an action on the contract while a suit for restitution involves
rescission and quasi-contract is to give more influence and cogency to the
doctrines of special pleading than they can possibly have in the modem law.
It is an added source of confusion to treat under the heading of restitution
such differing and inconsistent topics as (a) recovery of the value of his
performance by a party injured by a total breach of contract, and.(b) recovery
on the basis of unjust enrichment by a party who has himself committed a total
breach of contract, and (c) recovery for performance rendered under a
contract unenforceable because of non-c6mpliance with the Statute of
Frauds, 20 and (d) recovery for part performance under a contract where
o See § 1471.
'§§ 534-536; RESTATEMENT

OF CONTRACTS

§ 355.
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further performance has been excused and the contract discharged by impossibility.27 True, a common bond in these four types of cases is that under
the technical requirements of special pleading the action in each was in general
assumpsit, but that accident of history has far less significance today than the
essential differences.
The first type of case stated above involves merely an alternative remedy for
breach of contract. The second involves a quasi-contractual recovery of the
net benefit conferred upon the defendant, on the basis of unjust enrichment,
where the plaintiff by reason of his default cannot 'base his claim on the
contract.28 The third involves a contract which is unenforceable against the
defendant but not void, and after the plaintiff's part performance under the
terms of the contract, the defendant cannot refuse to go on without paying for
the plaintiff's performance as in (a).29 The fourth involves a situation where
the parties had a contract but by reason of circumstances beyond their control
it is discharged and the law adjusts their rights under the part that has been
performed. 0 Because of these differences, varying measures and theories of
recovery are found.31 It does not help to call the recovery restitution in each
case unless we at the same time define exactly what kind of restitution is meant.
In the Retatement of Contracts three of these situations are discussed in one
32
topic under the title "Restitution," and the fourth, though treated elsewhere,
is also labeled "restitution." In the Revised Edition, Chapter XLIV is
devoted primarily to the first two, but all four are- discussed there or elsewhere3 3 under the general headings of restitution and quasi-contract. Moreover, the difficulties incident to the study of restitution in its varying senses are
increased by discussions of the meaning of "rescission" (§ 1454A), rescission
after repudiation or breach where no performance has been rendered by the

'See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 468. In this situation the contract is discharged
without the fault of either party, and the measure of recovery is affected thereby. The
RESTATEMENT says that the remedy available to a party who has rendered a performance
under the contract is "restitution" and that he is entitled to recover the value of what he
has rendered less the value of what he has received; and the value of a performance is to
be measured by "The benefit derived from the performance in advancing the object of the
contract, not exceeding, however, a ratableportion of the contract price." In other words, a
party can recover to the extent that his performance has forwarded the object of the
contract, but not in excess of a ratable portion of the contract.
See §§ 1480-1483.
§ 536; RESTATEMENT § 355.
'See note 27 mepra.
'See §§ 1478-1483, discussing primarily the measure of recovery by a plaintiff who is
himself in default; § 536, stating that the measure of recovery by one who has rendered
a performance under a contract unenforceable because of non-compliance with the Statute
of Frauds is the "reasonable value of the detriment suffered by the plaintiff," or "the reasonable value of his performance if it was bargained for." This recovery is labeled "restitution" and (in § 534) "quasi-contract". See also § 1977, measure of recovery where
full performance is prevented by impossibility is the fair value of the performance rendered and prima facie a pro rata part of the contract price and not the benefit to the other
party. In § 1977 it is pointed out that this case must be distinguished both from cases
where plaintiff has been in fault and from cases where defendant has been in fault.
§ 468.
-See §§ 534-536, 1972-1977.
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aggrieved party (q 1465), and rescission for breach of warranty in a sale of
goods (§§ 1461 et seq.)
The Revised Edition is no mere supplement or revision bringing the original
materials down to date. Every topic has been re-examined and revised in the
light of new decisions, recent legislation, and changes in business practice.
Additions and modifications, in detail, are found in practically every section.
A considerable volume of new material, much of it statutory, has been
assimilated and integrated with the old. Notwithstanding the tremendous
scope of the work, the discussions of topics on the remote fringes of contract
law are quite complete and remarkably accurate. In the Revised Edition,
however, the general viewpoint and spirit of the first edition remain; in
most instances the arguments and conclusioiis are substantially unchanged.
This book is a worthy successor to the original Williston, enriched by the
authors' experience with the Restatement of Contracts. To the ripe scholarship and rich experience of Professor Williston have been added the fruits of
the untiring investigation and independent study of the subject by his disciple
and collaborator, Professor George J. Thompson.

